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 Trump as a Constitutional Failure 
JAMAL GREENE* 
As democracy is perfected, the office [of the President] represents, more 
and more closely, the inner soul of the people. . . . On some great and 
glorious day, the plain folks of the land will reach their heart’s desire at 
last and the White House will be adorned by a downright moron.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The election of Donald Trump as president represented a failure of American pol-
itics. Trump is a serial liar, a sexual predator, deeply conflicted financially, hostile to 
bedrock democratic institutions such as free press, and ignorant of even the broad 
brushstrokes of important policy matters. The best evidence suggests that he is a 
white nationalist, a plutocrat, and a professional con artist, dangerously attracted to 
corrupt and incompetent sycophants, self-obsessed and aggressive to the point of 
psychopathy, and otherwise temperamentally unfit to be in charge of the world’s 
largest military and nuclear arsenal. There is some evidence that Trump or members 
of his campaign conspired with a hostile foreign power to help secure his election.2 
His electoral opponent (whom he promised to prosecute criminally if elected) re-
ceived nearly three million more votes than he did,3 and he assumed office as the 
least popular elected president in recorded history.4 No credible account of a healthy 
electoral process can abide Trump’s election as an acceptable outcome of that pro-
cess. 
But you want to know what I really think. Less clear than the status of the Trump 
presidency as a political failure is whether Trump’s election also represented a failure 
of the U.S. Constitution. Do our constitutional arrangements predict just the kind of 
political failure that materialized in November 2016? If so, does that mean that the 
long-term remedy for that failure lies in constitutional reform? Does our constitu-
tional fate, in other words, determine our political fate? 
Before seeking to answer that question, it is important to note that its premise is 
not necessarily a politically partisan one. Trump ran as a Republican, but it is not just 
possible, but easy to imagine the American Left producing a corrupt and boorish 
demagogue who ascends to the apex of U.S. politics. Indeed, it would not be 
surprising if Trump himself appropriated some progressive rhetoric before all was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
 1. H.L. MENCKEN, Bayard vs. Lionheart, in ON POLITICS: A CARNIVAL OF BUNCOMBE 21 
(Malcom Moos, ed., 1956). Mencken wrote those words in 1920. Id. at 17. 
 2. See, e.g., Jo Becker, Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Russian Dirt on Clinton? “I 
Love It,” Donald Trump Jr. Said, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/07/11/us/politics/trump-russia-email-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/5MSG-ZZR9]. 
 3. Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN: POLITICS 
(Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-
popular-vote-final-count/index.html [https://perma.cc/V4PR-3F3E]. 
 4. Madeline Farber, Donald Trump’s Approval Ratings Have Hit a Historic Low Before 
He Takes Office, TIME (Jan. 17, 2017), http://time.com/4636142/donald-trump-inauguration-
polls-approval-ratings [https://perma.cc/YF5N-W534]. 
94 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:93 
 
said and done. Trump is today’s preoccupation, but the question is whether he is a 
symptom of a chronic disease or merely a seasonal one. 
Determining the causes of Trump’s election will occupy political scientists, his-
torians, sociologists, anthropologists, and economists for the rest of human history. 
Constitutional lawyers will have their own set of narratives. What follows is one 
contribution to that discussion. The basic claim is that there is a widening gap be-
tween the democratic order the U.S. Constitution presupposes and the one it governs. 
Unless that gap narrows, the at least occasional ascendancy of populist demagogues 
to the U.S. presidency is certain.  
As Part I explains, the American constitutional system assumes a certain sort of 
democratic culture. That assumption is encapsulated in Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
dictum, in M’Culloch v. Maryland, that the Constitution is “intended to endure for 
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human af-
fairs.”5 The U.S. Constitution indeed lacks “the prolixity of a legal code,” but subse-
quent history confirms that its relative sparseness is not, as Marshall maintained, be-
cause it is “a constitution we are expounding.”6 The U.S. Constitution is among the 
world’s least prolix and most difficult to amend. These attributes contribute to its 
mystique, but also render the constitutional text a radical underspecification of the 
American constitutional system. 
What stands in the place of the text is a set of norms and conventions that are the 
product of democratic culture. Thus, we refuse to wall off our borders, even as we 
regulate immigration. We have peaceful transitions of power, even where there may 
be electoral irregularities. We do not promise or threaten to jail our political oppo-
nents during the election, even when there may be evidence of crimes committed. 
We view nepotism as inherently suspicious. We reject the interference of hostile for-
eign states into our elections, even when they offer valuable information. We do not 
ban immigrants based on religion, or (openly) pillage the natural resources of de-
feated enemies. We act on the basis of our values and not simply our power.  
These norms appear obvious to those trained in the law or experienced in politics 
but they are not codified. They are subject to accretion and erosion but—and this is 
critical—rarely do they change through avulsion. This pattern of growth and decay 
in governing norms reflects a culture of respect for tradition, for existing institutions, 
and for the wisdom of prior generations. The U.S. Constitution lives less in its sparse 
text than in the connective tissue its normative order forms and reinforces. 
But maintaining an unwritten constitutional order requires a democratic culture 
that is, to put it plainly, prosocial rather than antisocial. Consider two ideal types of 
pluralistic democratic cultures. One operates on the basis of deliberation towards 
consensus, in the style envisioned by theorists such as John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas. The political community ruminates rationally and produces a dominant 
view. That view remains subject to contestation but its legitimacy is essentially ac-
cepted as the product of democratic deliberation in which citizens were able to par-
ticipate on broadly equal footing. This democratic culture is prosocial; its participants 
recognize their status as essentially equal members of a society—a collective enterprise 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis omitted), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XVI. 
 6. Id. at 407. 
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—that needs rules of decision in order to progress. 
The other ideal type of pluralistic democratic culture operates on the basis of 
power, in the style described by Carl Schmitt.7 Ideas are thoroughly discussed, 
perhaps even debated, but not in the service of persuasion. The ideas that win out 
are not the products of deliberation, much less consensus. They are those whose 
promoters have access to institutions that enable them to dominate and suffocate 
the ideas of others. This democratic culture is antisocial; its participants adopt an 
antagonistic posture towards each other and seek constantly to undermine and 
marginalize those who hold opposing views. 
This Essay argues that democratic culture in the United States is increasingly 
antisocial, and may become so to a degree that the American constitutional system 
cannot accommodate. President Trump’s election is a harbinger of this 
constitutional failure. As Part II explains, Trump’s hostility to the sustaining norms 
of the constitutional system reflects the ascendancy of a fundamentally 
antagonistic and hegemonic approach to democratic politics. The rise of this 
political culture is enabled by technological changes that have diminished the role 
of intermediaries in public life in ways that have contributed to political 
polarization and social balkanization.  
We need not assume that a polity exhibiting these antisocial features is un-
governable, but it is safe to say that its constitutional arrangements require strong 
rules of recognition. Relying on soft, unwritten norms is an invitation to abuse by 
whoever happens to be in power, which we can then expect to invite retaliatory 
abuse when power shifts.8 The existing U.S. Constitution is of a type one would 
expect of a reasonably socialized culture, but its politics are approaching those of 
a post-conflict society. 
Part III discusses what to do about the potential mismatch between American 
constitutional arrangements and American politics. Without assuming that any 
course of action will be successful—the forces arrayed against deliberative 
democracy are formidable—it is fair to say that the most promising strategies tend 
to channel the exercise of power and the promulgation of policy into processes of 
political negotiation.  
Reform in at least three broad areas might assist toward that end. First, 
American electoral institutions could be better suited to negotiated action. We 
should seek to bolster supermajority requirements, such as the filibuster, while at 
the same time seeking means of eroding party discipline by creating greater and 
more varied electoral competition. Second, we must think creatively about 
restoring or creating institutions of trust that can act as intermediaries between the 
public and our political actors. New models of media financing, including through 
public processes, or establishing government bodies tasked with public integrity 
may be better suited to the present moment than previously believed. Third, the 
judiciary has a role to play in reorienting our rights discourse toward dialogue, both 
between judges and political actors and within the political branches themselves.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., 
Univ. of Chi. Press expanded ed. 2007) (1932). 
 8. See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014); 
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004). 
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I. 
The U.S. Constitution is short, roughly 4500 words, and about 7500 words includ-
ing amendments. But it is not short because it is a constitution, as Marshall would 
have it; nearly every constitution in the world is longer.9 The U.S. Constitution is 
short because it is a particular kind of constitution, what is sometimes called a 
“framework” constitution.10 Unlike, say, Mexico’s constitution, which runs more 
than 60,000 words,11 the U.S. Constitution does little more than to describe, broadly, 
a political architecture. 
For example, the key powers to which the first three articles are committed—the 
legislative, executive, and judicial—are nowhere defined in the Constitution. The 
document permits Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare and to regulate 
interstate commerce, but it neither further defines those ends nor discusses the role 
of states in addressing the same subjects. It does not tell us whether there is to be an 
administrative state and, if so, what its permissible contours are. It does not explicitly 
grant to Article III judges the power of judicial review and indeed does not even 
establish a federal court system. The rights the Constitution provides are sparse and 
are generally stated in abstract terms. 
In addition to being sparse, the U.S. Constitution is difficult to amend. A formal 
amendment requires a two-thirds majority in Congress and the agreement of thirty-
eight states, nearly all of which have bicameral legislatures.12 More than 11,000 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been proposed in Congress; only 27 have 
been ratified, including just 17 in the last 226 years and one in the last 46.13 The 
German Basic Law has been amended more than 60 times in 68 years;14 the South 
African Constitution, 17 times in 21 years;15 the Mexican Constitution, more than 
500 times in just a century of life.16 
A constitution that is short, abstract, and difficult to change relies on the political 
system to develop and maintain informal institutional norms. There was some sense 
in the American framers resting on this possibility. They were statesmen already, 
nearly all of the fifty-five Philadelphia Convention delegates having held political 
office within their own states. Most were lawyers, and all were elites.17 They were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 105 (2009). 
 10. Id. at 71, 84. 
 11. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 15-09-2017. 
 12. The only state with a unicameral legislature is Nebraska. History of the Nebraska 
Unicameral, NEB. LEGISLATURE, http://nebraskalegislature.gov/about/history_unicameral.php 
[https://perma.cc/P7AF-CKFV]. 
 13. See Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 53 ALTA. 
L. REV. 85, 86 (2015); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why 
Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 692 (1996). 
 14. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, FED. MINISTRY INTERIOR, 
https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/constitution/constitutional-issues/constitutional-issues-
node.html [https://perma.cc/7C5W-KNL5]. 
 15. See S. AFR. CONST., Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012. 
 16. JORGE A. VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 4 (2011). 
 17. See JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER & CHRISTOPHER COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: 
2018] TRUMP AS A CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE  97 
 
accustomed to deliberation and negotiation. Moreover, a written constitution was a 
relatively novel thing in 1787, and the menu of institutional choices was limited rel-
ative to today. 
All three branches operate in substantial part according to subconstitutional polit-
ical norms. No constitutional provision specifies the manner in which congressional 
election or congressional voting is to be conducted, either denies or allows for fili-
busters or blue slips or committees, gives Congress any oversight role or subpoena 
or contempt power, or grants or denies it the power to create independent agencies. 
Although the Constitution contemplates that there will be executive officers,18 it does 
not anticipate the rise of the administrative state or seek to accommodate either 
agency rulemaking or executive branch adjudication into its text. It says little of how, 
by whom, or under what circumstances executive officials may be removed. The 
Constitution does not grant the power of judicial review, establish lower federal 
courts, specify the term of the Supreme Court or the number of Justices on it, provide 
for confirmation hearings, require that the Senate consider a judicial nominee at all, 
or prevent Congress from stripping the Court of jurisdiction to hear controversial 
matters. 
It is a mistake, however, to assume that the Constitution forms the sole or even 
the dominant basis for political continuity and solidarity within the United States. 
Thick political norms address and delimit all of the topics discussed above, as well 
as many others. Among those norms are obeying the pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court, sequestering the Department of Justice from specific presidential direction, 
maintaining conditionally open borders, cooperating in the staffing of the executive 
branch and the judiciary by a President of the opposing party, and permitting, indeed 
facilitating, media coverage of the President and other executive branch officials. 
These kinds of norms may have constitutional dimensions, but they are not con-
stitutionally specified and likely could be changed, at least over time, without any 
constitutional amendment. The reason they do not easily change rests in a shared 
sense among political and legal elites that these norms are constitutive of the consti-
tutional system. Legal and political professionals have been socialized into a set of 
attitudes about what constitutes on- and off-the-wall political behavior. Whether out 
of a sense of tradition, solidarity, or reciprocity, public officials have generally ad-
hered to the view that certain political practices are worth preserving even if doing 
so seems not to be those officials’ immediate best interest.19 
To train the mind on an alternative constitutional arrangement, consider the 1988 
Constitution of Brazil. The constitution was ratified three years after the country’s 
two-decade-long military dictatorship ended with Congress’s selection of opposition 
leader Tancredo Neves as president.20 As originally drafted, the Brazilian constitu-
tion contained 245 articles and an additional 70 transitory provisions, occupying 193 
                                                                                                                 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1986).  
 18. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 19. Julia R. Azari & Jennifer K. Smith, Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Estab-
lished Democracies, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 37, 37 (2012); cf. Emily Bazelon, How Do We Contend 
with Trump’s Defiance of “Norms”?, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/magazine/how-do-we-contend-with-trumps-defiance-of-
norms.html [https://perma.cc/8ZRC-78TT]. 
 20. Neves succumbed to illness before assuming office. Marlise Simons, Brazil’s Leader 
98 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:93 
 
pages in the official record.21 It has been amended nearly 100 times in just three 
decades since then. As Keith Rosenn notes, the Brazilian constitution, unlike its U.S. 
counterpart, contains “a great many detailed rules normally found in ordinary legis-
lation or regulations,”22 the result in part of a “generalized concern about disrespect 
for law.”23 Thus, the constitution defines “usury” as charging a real rate of interest 
in excess of twelve percent a year.24 It contains extensive and detailed workers’ rights 
provisions, specifying an eight-hour work day and a forty-four-hour work week.25 It 
has been amended to provide, for example, for the financing of the public lighting 
service and to provide a monthly pension to rubber tappers.26 
In light of Brazil’s civil law tradition and Portuguese influence, the level of detail 
in its constitution is likely overdetermined.27 Still, it is not surprising that a highly 
fractured, postauthoritarian political order eschewed a framework constitution over 
what might be deemed a Frankenstein one.28 Brazil’s political culture had a deep 
tradition of popular mobilization and political opposition, including during military 
rule. But it had no corresponding culture of deliberation and negotiation among rivals 
or of peaceful transitions of authority; rather, it had a shameful history of human 
rights abuses committed by its military leaders against political opponents. The 
Brazilian Constitution was designed for a society lacking a rich preexisting deliber-
ative culture. Skepticism about the nation’s political norms shows through the text. 
II. 
As the Brazil example implies, not all democracies are able to satisfy the condi-
tions necessary to maintain thick but informal political norms.  
Consider two ideal types. In the first, conflicting interests accept a common set of 
basic and constitutive political values—the equality and dignity of persons, the im-
partiality of the law and the political independence of judges, the centrality of a na-
tion-state that is nevertheless situated within a global economic order, and so forth. 
That acceptance is, following Cass Sunstein, incompletely theorized;29 following 
John Rawls, it reflects an overlapping consensus.30 Various individuals and groups 
within the society hold different worldviews, and so the conceptions that flesh out 
                                                                                                                 
 
Dies at Age 75; Never Sworn In, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com 
/1985/04/22/world/brazil-s-leader-dies-at-age-75-never-sworn-in.html [https://perma.cc 
/G96D-5G7R]. 
 21. Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutional-
ism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 777 (1990). 
 22. Id. at 778. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 798; see CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 195, sec. VIII, ¶ 3 (Braz.). 
 25. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 7, sec. XIII (Braz.). 
 26. See Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The Brazilian Constitutional Amendment Rate: A Cul-
ture of Change, I-CONNECT  (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/08/the-
brazilian-constitutional-amendment-rate-a-culture-of-change [https://perma.cc/S8E6-ZSQA]. 
 27. See Rosenn, supra note 21, at 778. 
 28. See id. at 777 n.15. 
 29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
 30. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1987). 
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the agreed upon concepts are quite different. One side believes that the importance 
of political and economic sovereignty dictates a wary view of global trade and im-
migration. The other side believes that economic equality, the dignity of workers, or 
the well-being of political or economic migrants requires a different balance. One 
side believes that government is most effective at its core functions of national secu-
rity and law enforcement when a nimble and politically accountable executive exer-
cises control over the bureaucratic machinery without significant interference from 
courts or legislators. The other side believes that control of that sort unacceptably 
threatens individual liberty or the rule of law. Each side understands and accepts the 
basic liberal democratic project and accepts the legitimacy of the values the other 
side promotes, but they weigh those values differently. Their relationship is as be-
tween political competitors rather than adversaries or enemies.31 The policy out-
comes that result from this kind of conflict are negotiable. Political theorists—
Habermas and Rawls most prominently—have set about explicating the conditions 
of negotiation.32 
One of those conditions, for example, is a robust and open space for political con-
versation.33 The constitutional commitment to freedom of speech has been read as 
protecting a marketplace of ideas whose currency is truth.34 The metaphor assumes 
that deregulation will lead individual participants within the marketplace to have 
greater, not less, access to challenging ideas and that they will have the will and 
capacity to reflect upon those ideas. The relationship between market actors is delib-
erative in the service of reaching a set of political equilibria. 
The marketplace of ideas metaphor has less purchase within a second ideal type 
of democratic order. Within this order, participants have competing world views that 
either are in fact or are believed to be irreconcilable. Such a society might be notion-
ally democratic insofar as political leadership is assigned through an electoral mech-
anism. But the project of each side is not to negotiate towards a policy outcome ev-
eryone can live with; it is to dominate, marginalize, and kneecap the other side. The 
winners and losers of such conflicts exist in a hegemonic and antagonistic relation-
ship as one seeks any means of extending its power that it can get away with and the 
other seeks unrelentingly to undermine that power. The free flow of ideas serves each 
project, not because it facilitates negotiation, but because it facilitates conspiracy and 
affiliation with like-minded others. Here, democracy and distrust are sympathetic 
ideas; they require no reconciliation.35 Political theorists have explicated the conditions 
under which this kind of democratic order can (see, for example, Chantal Mouffe)36 or 
cannot (see, most prominently, Carl Schmitt)37 redeem liberal commitments. 
Which of these democratic orders sounds closer to the one that elected President  
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, Introduction: Schmitt’s Challenge, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
CARL SCHMITT 1, 5 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1999). 
 32. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996); JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (3d ed. 2005). 
 33. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 
(2011). 
 34. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 35. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 36. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL (1993). 
 37. See SCHMITT, supra note 7. 
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Trump? The question is neither hypothetical nor glib. It is difficult to dispute that 
Trump himself uncannily embodies Schmitt’s conception of the political, as evi-
denced by his campaign’s apparent unblinking willingness to collude with the 
Russian government to tarnish Hillary Clinton.38 Still, it would be too quick to speak 
of the electorate as a whole in such terms. The United States has a robust and politi-
cally independent press, a respected and professional federal court system, and nu-
merous temperamentally moderate political figures, including Clinton and every ma-
jor party nominee for president since at least 1984 (save, of course, Trump). Polling 
has consistently shown voters to be less polarized than their leaders and to have a 
general preference for compromise over principled opposition.39 
The problem is that Americans too often understand compromise as meaning that 
the other side should cave. That is evidenced by consistently low approval ratings 
for Congress (twenty percent in a July 2017 Gallup poll40 and under thirty percent 
for eight years running) and consistently high ratings for one’s own member of 
Congress (a five percent net positive in a 2013 poll).41 Internalizing and accepting 
the wages of compromise requires a thick understanding not only of substantive pol-
icy issues but also of the shape of the political landscape. This kind of system 
knowledge is undersupplied in the current information environment.  
John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse make the point effectively in their 2002 
book, Stealth Democracy.42 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue based on extensive sur-
vey evidence that a substantial number of Americans are hostile to ordinary politics 
in part because they lack the capacity or the will to recognize the fact of reasonable 
policy disagreement. They write: 
[P]eople are simply averse to political conflict and many others believe 
political conflict is unnecessary and an indication that something is 
wrong with governmental procedures. People believe that Americans all 
have the same basic goals, and they are consequently turned off by po-
litical debate and deal making that presuppose an absence of consensus. 
People believe these activities would be unnecessary if decision makers 
were in tune with the (consensual) public interest rather than with ca-
cophonous special interests.43 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Becker et al., supra note 2.  
 39. See MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?: 
THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 16–17 (3d ed. 2011); Frank Newport, Americans Con-
tinue To Want Political Leaders To Compromise, GALLUP (Sept. 21, 2016), http:// 
www.gallup.com/poll/195707/americans-continue-political-leaders-compromise.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9Q54-Z4CF]. 
 40. RJ Reinhart, Americans’ Approval of Congress Remains Low, Steady, GALLUP (July 
12, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/213944/americans-approval-congress-remains-low-
steady.aspx [https://perma.cc/9GCC-7Y6D]. 
 41. Congress and the Public, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-
public.aspx [https://perma.cc/T5PX-NE3N]; Elizabeth Mendes, Americans Down on 
Congress, OK with Own Representative, GALLUP (May 9, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll 
/162362/americans-down-congress-own-representative.aspx [https://perma.cc/U6TZ-LBUA].  
 42. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY (2002). 
 43. Id. at 7. 
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Candidate Trump took advantage of this information gap by making confident but 
unrealistic promises—about health care, about entitlements, about ISIS, about for-
eign policy, about immigration, about economic growth—to especially low- infor-
mation voters. His lack of any political track record meant that he had not yet shown 
himself to be unable to deliver on his agenda. 
While the presence of people holding these views about politics is not new, it 
might be uniquely damaging in the present information, political, and economic en-
vironment. First, facts are in a bad way. Americans (and not just Americans) increas-
ingly acquire factual information from diffuse and biased or otherwise unreliable 
sources. Technological change has enabled information to be shared more quickly 
and through networks customized to the interests and ideologies of the recipient. Our 
declining respect for truth is not a triumph of relativism but rather of its opposite: 
extremism. It is not that we perceive and reflect upon the ways in which perspective 
alters perception, but rather that we perfectly model those distortions. Our experi-
ences are not communally shared, which in turn reinforces our mutual suspicion. The 
percentage of Americans with a high degree of trust in national news organizations 
sits at eleven percent of Republicans, thirty-four percent of Democrats, and fifteen 
percent of independents.44 The number of institutions with the capacity to convey 
politically relevant facts appears to be in sharp decline. 
Second, and relatedly, national politics are controlled by polarized interests that 
glom onto a sclerotic two-party system. Although the parties themselves have 
changed in character, national politics in the United States has been dominated by 
two—and only two—parties for nearly all of the country’s history under the current 
Constitution. No third party candidate has ever won the U.S. presidency and no third 
party has even sniffed a majority in either congressional chamber. The two-party 
system is remarkably stable despite widespread disdain for both parties. What is less 
stable is leadership control of the composition and agenda of political officials within 
the parties. 
Political primaries have come to be the chief means of selecting candidates as a 
result of progressive reform of occluded or opaque processes dominated by party 
bosses.45 What was once controlled by insiders, often corrupt but attuned to the long-
term survival of the party, is now controlled by extremists who enforce ideological 
purity. The prevalence of sophisticated gerrymanders combined with historic polar-
ization levels has made the primary the only significant election for most members 
of Congress.46 This means that the sole mechanism of political accountability for 
most members is internal to the parties. Moreover, the voters who turn out for pri-
mary elections are not a representative sample. Participation in the Republican and 
Democratic primaries was high in relative terms in 2016, but primary voters still 
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represented only 28.5% of eligible voters.47 Less than one in ten eligible voters cast 
votes in the 2014 midterm elections.48 These kinds of turnout numbers make primary 
elections susceptible to ideological appeals and funding by narrow interest groups. 
Third, the current level of socioeconomic inequality in the United States, and its 
special causes, is likely exacerbating existing political polarization. Trump won vot-
ers without a college degree by eight points, and won white voters without a college 
degree by thirty-nine points, the largest such margin since 1980.49 The top one per-
cent of American families holds roughly forty percent of the country’s wealth, nearly 
double what it held at the dawn of Jimmy Carter’s presidency.50 Nearly one-half of 
income gains in the United States from 1979 to 2007 went to the top one percent of 
earners.51 When the economy collapsed in 2008, the federal government then bailed 
out banks rather than homeowners. Manufacturing jobs, once a reliable path to the 
middle class for Americans without a college degree, continue to be replaced by au-
tomation and, to a lesser degree, global trade.52 The returns to elite higher education 
are substantial.53 Many newly marginalized Americans feel nostalgic for a time when 
the middle class was larger and less diverse.54 
Promising to “make America great again,” Trump gave them hope. His hope was 
not grounded in the inclusive, optimistic, and redemptive politics of his predecessor. 
To the contrary, Trump offered comfort in the profane. For Trump, nothing was or 
is sacred, and so notionally, nothing stood in the way of his pursuit of his constitents’ 
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interest.55 Ronald Dworkin famously analogized constitutional interpretation to 
writing a new chapter in a chain novel.56 Each new author had some discretion to 
forge the path ahead, but was constrained by “fit” with the previously authored ma-
terial.57 A president within a healthy, deliberative democratic culture faces the same 
opportunity and the same constraint. A president within an agonistic, Schmittian 
democratic culture is unconstrained by previous norms, indeed may even be hostile 
to those norms just for being previous. Trump is not adding a new chapter to a novel. 
He is writing—nay, tweeting—an entirely new text.  
On Dworkin’s view, law as integrity helps to constitute us as a community. It 
places demands on each citizen to understand the law in light of a common scheme 
of justice that is integral to shared political life.58 The argument in favor of law as 
integrity applies as well to the integrity of political institutions. In a practical sense, 
citizens and other government actors, foreign and domestic, rely on those norms to 
structure their behavior and to make investments. The longevity of certain practices 
bears upon their wisdom,59 or should at least give us pause in revising them without 
forethought. But it is more than that. Subconstitutional institutions are the Jenga 
blocks of the constituted nation; their sudden avulsion can crash the system. Specific 
constitutions are designed, with varying degrees of success, to map out which blocks 
can be removed, and how. Framework constitutions like that of the United States do 
not identify the blocks but rather articulate a political structure designed to resist 
avulsion altogether. The Constitution might be our national sacrament,60 but the 
norms it leaves unspecified are what sustain us.61 
III. 
There is no easy answer to the problem just described. When the constitutional 
order does not match the political culture, the solution is to change one of the two. 
As Part I discusses, changing the U.S. Constitution through formal means is fa -
mously difficult.62 Changing it informally requires just the prosocial attitude and 
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orientation toward consensus that the political culture undersupplies. Moreover, 
designing a constitution for a deeply divided society typically requires difficult 
compromises and specifications that are achievable only when the cost of failure is 
transparent. The United States suffers from political rupture but it has suffered nei-
ther a recent civil war nor anything comparable that would put its citizens on notice 
as to its constitutional shortcomings. To the contrary, the current U.S. constitutional 
culture features a level of constitutional worship that at least borders on the cultish.63 
Efforts to change the political culture itself are not much easier, but at least they 
are not premised on the very possibility of consensus that we must restore. This Part 
proposes three areas of relative promise: electoral mechanics; the media and public 
trust; and rights review. These areas are not promising because change within them 
is likely or easy, but rather because such change would be meaningful and produc-
tive. 
Electoral Mechanics 
The first area is voting. By that term, I mean to encompass a range of fora through 
which political decision making occurs, both within legislatures and among the gen-
eral public. Within legislatures, supermajority requirements and other vetogates can 
be used to force otherwise passive or hostile parties into negotiation.64 In Congress, 
these mechanisms include the filibuster in the Senate, so-called blue slips that enable 
a single Senator to block a judicial appointment from his or her state, and markup 
rules that require committee action in order for bills to reach the floor of the chamber. 
Placing political economy to one side, such constraints could be extended, for exam-
ple, by subjecting budget reconciliation to filibusters65 or importing the filibuster in 
whole or in part to the House of Representatives. 
Under certain conditions, supermajority requirements result not in consensus pol-
icy making but simply in inaction. The balance between the two is likely to depend 
on the political cost of inactivity in relation to compromise. In a deeply polarized 
environment in which party loyalists enjoy greater power through primaries (both as 
voters and as financers) than moderate voters enjoy through the general election, the 
balance can easily tip toward stalemate.66 To wit, legislative gridlock appears to be a 
fixed feature of our national life.67 The modern filibuster itself, which over the last 
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three decades has come to be associated with party cohesion rather than 
independent senators,68 reflects the current polarized climate. Accordingly, it is 
important to couple innovation in chamber voting rules with innovation in the 
electoral process writ large. 
With respect to political decision making among the general public, then, a num-
ber of interventions could help to force political negotiation and deliberation. Party 
discipline within the United States is at historic highs.69 American separation of pow-
ers was designed to operate based on diffusion of power across institutions with dif-
ferent bases of accountability: the House, the Senate, the President, the courts, and 
the states. With the rise of national political parties in the 1790s, the proliferation of 
political primaries after 1968, and the sophisticated use of gerrymandering to ensure 
that House members focus on primaries rather than the general election, the number 
of moderate officeholders—those open to hearing the arguments of members of the 
opposing party—has diminished substantially. 
Party discipline can erode in any number of ways. The Supreme Court has the 
opportunity in its 2017 Term to develop a standard that newly subjects political ger-
rymandering to constitutional scrutiny.70 Relaxing the existing federal statutory con-
straint on single member districts, and thereby permitting some at large voting, would 
create incentives for representatives to be responsive to a broader cross section of the 
population. First-past-the-post voting enables an electoral victory with less than a 
majority of the vote. Scrapping first past the post in favor of instant runoff or pro-
portionality voting would eliminate the phenomenon of “wasted” votes and thereby 
enable third party candidates to be competitive in U.S. elections. More robust public 
financing of political campaigns might open the political process to actors who are 
not beholden to party machines. 
Intermediation 
Restoring shared intermediaries is not easy. The media environment is forever 
altered, in many respects for the better. Still, the lack of trust that has accompanied 
media diffusion hampers political negotiation. More substantial public financing of 
media could provide news organizations with the resources to provide coverage that 
is both deep and broad. The current vehicle for public media financing is the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), which was created in 1967 and is re-
sponsible for the advent of PBS and NPR. The CPB Board is politically balanced by 
statute,71 and PBS and NPR have both enjoyed relatively strong reputations for jour-
nalistic excellence and independence.72 
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It is telling that President Trump has proposed that the CPB be eliminated; its 
dramatic expansion could assist in restoring trust in American media. Additional 
public financing could take the form of increasing the budgets of public media 
organizations but could also be more experimentalist in nature.73 For example, the 
Knight Foundation has seeded a fund to provide innovation grants to local media 
organizations.74 The government could do the same through an independent but 
publicly financed board. 
Information intermediaries need not comprise media as traditionally 
understood. Trusted institutions remain in the United States. Courts and the 
military, for example, enjoy broad levels of diffuse support that far outpace those 
of the political branches.75 These institutions enjoy a reputation for professionalism 
and political independence. Likewise, certain administrative agencies such as the 
Congressional Budget Office and the Federal Reserve have, respectively, civil 
servants and political appointees whose decision making is widely viewed as 
nonpartisan.  
We should think creatively about whether we might construct institutions 
focused on production or curation of information that can enjoy similar reputations. 
For example, South Africa’s constitution provides for a Public Protector, an 
independent institution that serves “as a buffer between the state and ordinary 
people.”76 The Public Protector investigates complaints about provision of 
government services and the conduct of government officials and addresses 
broader issues of corruption and administrative malfeasance.77 Imagine a similar 
institution, structured to be politically independent, that had privileged access to 
government information and was empowered not just to act as an inspector general 
to investigate political corruption but also, for example, to fact check statements 
issued by the White House Press Office. Such an office would raise serious 
separation of powers concerns, but that is precisely the point. The current 
separation of powers model in the United States might be inadequate to sustain the 
constitutional order in the present information environment. 
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Proportionality 
Courts have a role to play in structuring the political environment to encourage 
deliberation. American courts can and should do better along this dimension. The 
notional frame for constitutional rights adjudication in U.S. courts is categorical ra-
ther than oriented toward balancing. Taking guidance from the Supreme Court, 
courts assess whether a rights claim may be placed in a delimited category of pre-
sumptive protection. If so, a form of strict or heightened scrutiny applies. There are 
many exceptions, to be sure.78 But the exceptions are less in the nature of promoting 
balancing than in the nature of creating additional doctrinal categories: intermediate 
scrutiny for particular discrimination claims, special First Amendment doctrines for 
particular fora,79 and so forth.80 
One consequence of this categorical frame is that the stakes of being declared a 
rights-holder are high. Thus, throughout the 1960s and through much of the 1970s, 
much women’s rights advocacy sought to compare gender to race and thereby for 
women facing government discrimination to enjoy the benefit of strict scrutiny. 
Desegregation cases turned heavily on the question of whether segregation was de 
jure, in which case courts could order coercive remedies, or de facto, in which case 
courts were disempowered entirely. For decades, affirmative action cases featured 
extended argumentation over the standard of review to apply to the claims of partic-
ular groups.81 Constitutional disparate impact claims and claims based on social and 
economic rights have been rejected on the ground that courts lack the doctrinal re-
sources to adjudicate them contextually.82 This posture towards rights encourages 
litigants to seek to persuade courts that they “count,” that the Constitution recognizes 
the richness of their injuries, knowing that the alternative is being told that it does 
not. 
Transnationally, the alternative to categorical adjudication of the American sort 
is proportionality.83 Proportionality is a structured framework that tends to reorient 
constitutional adjudication away from the ex ante question of whether the claimant 
is a rights-bearer and toward the ex post question of whether the government’s treat-
ment of the claimant was justified.84 Proportionality tests typically understand rights 
broadly but require courts to focus on whether the government was acting reasonably 
(was there adequate means-ends fit?), efficiently (was the government action no 
more burdensome than it needed to be?), and proportionally (was the government’s 
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action excessive in relation to the benefit in policy terms and the injury in rights 
terms?).85 
Proportionality describes the dominant adjudicative framework among the world’s  
constitutional courts, and there are benefits to adopting it in the United States. For 
the purposes of this Essay, its benefits are several. First, it lowers the stakes of 
political conflict because it tends to avoid requiring the court to declare that one or 
the other side of a constitutional rights dispute is beneath constitutional concern. 
Second, proportionality encourages the government to take into account the concerns 
of affected parties, since its attention and responsiveness to those concerns informs 
the doctrinal test. Third, proportionality tends to channel rights conflict into conflict 
over empirical facts. In a postfact environment, proportionality enables judges to avail 
themselves of their positions as relatively trusted arbiters of factual claims.86 
In addition to more explicitly adopting a form of proportionality analysis, courts 
can help spur deliberation by thinking more flexibly about remedies. One device used 
by courts around the world, but deployed rarely in the United States, is a suspension 
of invalidity, what the German Constitutional Court calls “unconstitutional but not 
void.”87 Under this remedial posture, an unconstitutional law is not immediately in-
validated; rather, the court retains jurisdiction and gives the legislature a fixed period 
of time in which to craft a remedy consistent with articulated constitutional 
guideposts. A suspension of invalidity is a dialogic approach to constitutional adju-
dication that situates the court as a mediator of political conflict rather than solely as 
a decision maker. 
CONCLUSION 
A framework constitution permits a people to be the author of its own constitu-
tional fate. A pluralistic political community that is fit for mutual engagement, one 
whose members understand themselves as participants in the same collective enter-
prise, as negotiating the same set of basic values, as dealing with others who are 
the same but for the political conclusions they reach, can forge durable 
subconstitutional institutions. For a more antagonistic political community, one 
characterized by mutual suspicion and an adversarial posture toward ideological 
competitors, a framework constitution is an opportunity for great mischief. 
Donald Trump is one of history’s great opportunists. The American political 
culture is sufficiently in the grips of political antagonism that Candidate Trump’s 
core promise—a profane posture towards American institutions—resonated with 
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substantial numbers of voters. The U.S. Constitution does not anticipate avulsive 
politics of this sort. It cannot help us. 
This Essay has sketched preliminary suggestions for mitigating the effects of ad-
versarial politics in the United States: restoring or installing supermajority require-
ments to encourage political negotiation; putting pressure on the two-party system 
through electoral reform; implementing more aggressive public funding of media 
organizations or creating institutions of public integrity to try to restore political in-
termediation; and adopting proportionality analysis in courts.  
The constitutional challenge of the twenty-first century will be to reinvigorate the 
discursive life of the res publica. There is no going back from the technological en-
vironment that fractures and diffuses the political audience: Cronkite is dead. But we 
cannot forget that, for all his remarkable prescience, Mencken was wrong. The poli-
tics that produced President Trump represent not democracy’s perfection but its per-
version. 
